Footnotes to part TWO of Why monarchies persist

Note: As the text has been abridged, only the footnotes that address the reduced text are shown here. The numbers correspond to the ones in the text.

68 Steven David, ‘Explaining Third World Alignment’, World Politics, 43 (1991), p. 233;
See also Michael Barnett, ‘High Politics is Low Politics’, World Politics, 42 (1990), pp. 529–62; Mohammed Ayoob, ‘The Security Problematic in the Third World’, World Politics, 43 (1991),
pp. 257–83.

69 Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, ‘Why Did Arab Monarchies Fall? An Analysis of Old and New
Explanations’, in Kostiner (ed.), The Middle Eastern Monarchies, p. 48.

72 Indeed, when the Egyptian air-force began attacking Saudi territory in February 1963, the US promptly assured the Saudis of a US military presence, provided that Faisal cease completely his support for the royalists.

73 This commitment was made good in July 1963 when US Airforce flights deterred a possible Egyptian invasion.

74 The American role in securing Saudi security during Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 was even more critical.

82 Yahia Zoubir, ‘Soviet Policy in the Maghreb’, Arab Studies Quarterly, 9 (1989), p. 129.
84 Ibid.

85 This point complements Benny Miller’s model that systemic factors are responsible for movement from Cold War to cold peace but are unable to influence either the change from Cold War to hot war and cold to warm peace. Only US hegemony, a systemic factor can ensure the protection of these regimes from outside forces. See, Benjamin Miller, ‘Balance of Power or the State-to-Nation Balance: Explaining Middle East War-Propensity’, Security Studies, 15 (2006), pp. 658–705.

86 ‘For much of this time, all the Gulf States except Saudi Arabia were, in essence, British protectorates. Britain withdrew from the area in 1971. For the US and the entire industrialised world, stability in this region is vital. The relative share of Gulf energy is likely to grow in coming decades, as reserves elsewhere decline.’ See Sick, ‘The Coming’, p. 15.

87 In the early 1990s, the six monarchies in the Gulf alone accounted for 46.3 per cent of all proven oil reserves. See Gause, ‘The Persistence’ in Oil Monarchies, p. 176. He also discusses the American foreign policy debate whether a strong presence in the area is necessary to assure oil or whether market forces would ensure oil supplies. At least since the 1990s, it would be fair to say that the US has opted to be on the safe side by ensuring a sizeable military presence in the area.


88 To gauge the Gulf states’ importance for the US arms industry suffice to note that Saudi Arabian arms purchases alone amounted to 39.6 billion dollars between 1990–1999 while total US made arms sales for that period stood at 137.5 billion dollars. Figures derived from www.deskbook.osdmil/reflib/ddod/001endoc.htm} and {www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/saudi_arabia.htm}.

 89 Hart, Saudi Arabia and the US, pp. 123–4.
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